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OPINION
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge
Kwame Dwumaah pled guilty to theft of public monies under 18 U.S.C. § 641.
He was subsequently found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) for falsely
claiming U.S. citizenship. Dwumaah now seeks a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his
conviction on the ground that he was misadvised of the immigration consequences of his
plea. The District Court ultimately denied the writ. Dwumaah appeals.1 We affirm.
I. Background
Dwumaah, a native of Ghana, initially entered the United States on a nonimmigrant visa in 1989 and remained in the country after the visa expired. He later
married a U.S. citizen and subsequently became a conditional permanent resident in
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Dwumaah is represented on appeal by pro
bono counsel from the Dechert firm. We express our appreciation for undertaking that
representation and its professionalism in doing so.
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1999. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) determined Dwumaah’s marriage
to be fraudulent in June 2004 and later that year began removal proceedings under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D) (“Termination of conditional permanent residence”).
In April 2005, Dwumaah was indicted for twenty-eight counts of fraud under
various statutes. The primary allegation of the indictment was that he had improperly
acquired over $75,000 in federal student aid by using a false name and Social Security
number and misrepresenting his immigration status.
Under a plea agreement, Dwumaah pled guilty to a single count of theft of public
monies in August 2005. At the time, he was represented by John Abom in the criminal
proceeding and Wayne Sachs in the immigration proceeding. As later found by the
District Court, Abom and Sachs worked together to arrange a plea bargain that would
avoid aggravated felon status under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which would render
Dwumaah automatically removable. In recommending the plea, Abom told Dwumaah he
might still face removal if the crime were classified as a crime of moral turpitude under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). At the time, Abom was apparently not aware of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(3)(D)(i), under which a person can be subject to removal for falsely claiming
U.S. citizenship. Dwumaah was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and one year
supervised release and ordered to pay $75,192 in restitution.
DHS subsequently amended the Notice to Appear in the removal proceedings to
include § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i). An Immigration Judge eventually determined Dwumaah’s
marriage was not fraudulent but found him removable based on a false claim of U.S.
citizenship (for which no formal conviction is necessary). Dwumaah subsequently
3

pursued unsuccessful collateral attacks on his conviction before filing a pro se petition
for a writ of error coram nobis in September 2011. In this petition, he argued that he
would not have pled guilty had he been properly informed of the removal consequences
of his plea as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). In February 2013,
the District Court granted the writ and vacated Dwumaah’s conviction in reliance on
United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630 (3d Cir. 2011), which held that Padilla applied
retroactively.
Nineteen days later, the Supreme Court held in Chaidez v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 1103 (2013), that Padilla did not apply retroactively, thus abrogating Orocio. The
Government moved to reconsider the grant of the writ based on Chaidez. Dwumaah,
through counsel, opposed the motion. The District Court granted the motion and, on
reconsideration, denied the writ of error coram nobis. Dwumaah now appeals that denial.
II. Analysis
In appeals from the denial of a writ of error coram nobis, “[w]e review the District
Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” Mendoza v.
United States, 690 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012). A district court has the power, under
appropriate circumstances, to grant a writ of error coram nobis and vacate a conviction,
see United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511(1954), but the writ “is an extraordinary
remedy, and a court’s jurisdiction to grant relief is of limited scope.” United States v.
Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Indeed, “it is difficult to conceive of a
situation in a federal criminal case today where [a writ of error coram nobis ] would be
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necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 n.4 (1947)).
From the governing cases, one can discern five requirements a movant must meet
to receive coram nobis relief from a federal conviction. First, he or she must no longer
be in custody and therefore not be eligible for alternative remedies such as habeas
corpus. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1106 n.1. Second, he or she must nonetheless suffer
continuing consequences of his or her conviction. United States v. Osser, 864 F.2d 1056,
1059 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512-13). Third, “coram nobis relief is
limited to correct[ing] errors ‘of the most fundamental character.’” Id. (quoting Morgan,
346 U.S. at 512). Fourth, there must have been no remedy for the defect available at trial.
Stoneman, 870 F.2d at 106 (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512). Finally, the petitioner must
show that “‘sound reasons’ exist for failing to seek relief earlier.” Id.
The parties effectively agree that the first two elements are satisfied. Dwumaah is
no longer in custody and thus is ineligible for habeas relief. See United States v.
Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 2000). The District Court concluded that the
possibility of removal was a sufficient continuing consequence of conviction, and the
Government has not challenged that conclusion.
The dispute here centers on whether Dwumaah has shown a fundamental error in
his trial, in particular ineffective assistance of counsel. It is well established in our
caselaw that ineffective assistance of counsel is a fundamental error for purposes of a writ
of error coram nobis. See, e.g., United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612
F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[P]ersons not held in custody can attack a conviction for
5

fundamental defects, such as ineffective assistance of counsel. The mechanism is a
motion in the form of the common-law writ of error coram nobis.” (citing cases)).
Dwumaah argues that the District Court erred because it failed to recognize the
distinction between failure to advise and affirmative misadvice as to immigration
consequences. While Chaidez precludes an ineffectiveness claim based on the former,
Dwumaah contends that affirmative misadvice was recognized as ineffective assistance
prior to Padilla and that he deserves relief on this basis. He essentially argues that it was
affirmative misadvice for Abom to inform him that, under the plea, removal was a mere
possibility under the moral turpitude provision when in fact removal was essentially
certain under the false claim of citizenship provision.
We do not get to the merits of his claim because Dwumaah waived this argument.
In United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2013), we held “that for parties to
preserve an argument for appeal, they must have raised the same argument in the District
Court—merely raising an issue that encompasses the appellate argument is not enough.”
Id. at 337 (emphases in original). In reaching this conclusion, we clarified our use of
terminology: “an issue can be broader in scope than an argument in that an issue may be
addressed by multiple arguments, which are the most basic building blocks of legal
reasoning.” Id. “[T]he crucial question regarding waiver is whether [the appellant]
presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district court.” Brennan v.
Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983
F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir.1993)).
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Although Dwumaah has repeatedly raised the issue of ineffective assistance, he
raises for the first time on appeal the argument of ineffective assistance on the basis of
affirmative misadvice. His pro se petition contains a single-sentence assertion that he
was affirmatively misadvised, without any supporting legal argumentation, based on a
factual allegation the District Court specifically rejected. This is insufficient to alert the
District Court. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir.
2009) (“A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue will not suffice to preserve it
for appeal . . . .”). Dwumaah’s subsequent counseled filings before the District Court do
not argue that he was affirmatively misadvised.2 There are no references in his filings
prior to this appeal to a non-Padilla based protection against affirmative misadvice, even
in his (counseled) opposition to the Government’s post-Chaidez motion for
reconsideration. The District Court therefore never had the opportunity to consider the
affirmative misadvice theory of ineffective assistance of counsel because Dwumaah
never presented it to that Court. As such, this argument is waived.3
On appeal, Dwumaah has presented no other arguments for ineffective assistance
of counsel. As a result, he has not shown a fundamental error at trial, a prerequisite to a

2

After it granted an evidentiary hearing on the basis of Dwumaah’s pro se petition, the
District Court appointed a solo practitioner to represent Dwumaah in the coram nobis
proceedings. This attorney remained as counsel until he made an unopposed motion to
withdraw two days after the District Court order granting reconsideration and denying the
writ.
3
Dwumaah argues in the alternative that we ought to exercise our discretion to reach the
waived argument. See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005). We decline
to do so.
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writ of error coram nobis, and thus cannot establish a right to relief. It is therefore
unnecessary for us to address the remaining requirements for the writ. Thus we affirm.
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